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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 07/07/2011 Accident number: 710 
Accident time: 10:40 Accident Date: 28/12/2010 
Where it occurred: AF/3203/00398, 
MF0081, Dragi Village, 
Tani district, Khost 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: 07/02/2011 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed] 
CBDT 
 
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 07/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DEMINING ACCIDENT  
1 
INTRODUCTION:  
Investigation team was convened by AMAC Southeast to investigate the demining accident 
occurred to [Demining group] on 28 December 2011 [sic] at 10:40 am in Task No: 
AF/3203/00398/MF0081 of Dragi village, Tani district of Khost province. The accident caused 
the amputation of right leg and left foot toes of [the Victim], deminer of [Demining group], 
CBDT-23. 
SUMMARY: 
MF 0081 is located on the top of a hill east side of Sre Kalay of Dragi village, Tani district of 
Khost province. The mines were laid by Russian troops to prevent Mujahidin’s attacks during 
1987-1992. Around 15 accidents occurred on animals in this minefield. Mine clearance 
operations in Tani district started by [Demining group] as community based demining 
approach and deminers from the community are engaged in this operation. [Demining group] 
CBDT-23 started clearance operation in mentioned task on 08 Jul 2010. The size of area is 
23,549 sqm and the team has cleared 17,597 sqm (75%) and destroyed 28 AP mines till the 
accident time. This is the second de mining accident in this minefield. 
According to investigation report and the observation of accident point, the accident occurred 
in un-cleared area within the minefield. The deminer was returning back from the rest area to 
resume the work in his clearance lane, he entered into the minefield, stepped on PMN2 anti-
personnel mine and accident happened. The worksite was well prepared and the area was 
clearly marked in accordance to the [Demining group] SOPs. The deminer did not consider 
and use the clear access lane to proceed to his working area while he was well aware about 
the cleared/un-cleared parts of the minefield. He was not stopped by command group when 
he crossed the marking and entered to the minefield.  
The accident caused his right leg traumatic amputation above ankle and left foot toes 
amputation. The de-miner was evacuated to Khost hospital after receiving of first aids in the 
operation site. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The main contributing factor to this accident is carelessness and negligence of deminer from 
the organization SOPs. The command group has also failed to stop the deminer from such an 
action.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
• [Demining group] is recommended to identify, analyze the situation involved with 
frequent accidents in Tani CB project and come up with a comprehensive plan of 
actions to resolve the problem.   
• Both the deminers and command group require specific trainings based on the 
shortfalls identified during the internal and external investigations. The traditional 
refresher training may not solve the problem.  
• [Demining group] operations department is recommended to develop a plan for the 
improvement of supervision, command and control in their teams.   
Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to 





Victim number: 895 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee; Toes  




The primary cause of this accident is listed as Inadequate training because the investigators 
recommend that “specific trainings” were required. The secondary cause is listed as a Field 
Control Inadequacy because the Victim walked over an uncleared area and his error was not 
corrected. It seems likely that he was unaware of the risks he was taking, which implies either 
a fundamental absence of training, or an absence of willingness for the command group to fail 
trainees who do not learn the basics. Failure to provide effective training is a significant 
Management Control Inadequacy. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility. 
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